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Precarity and Gentrification: A Feedback Loop
Samuel Stein
How do  rent  hikes  and  labor  precarity  conspire  to  reinforce  each  other  against tenants  and
workers? Samuel Stein explains the mechanisms that link these two trends affecting citizens and
calls for a tightening of rent-control laws to stop the spiraling descent of American residents into
poverty.
Two of the most commonly discussed features of neoliberal capitalism are precarious labor and
gentrified cities.  As jobs become increasingly insecure,  housing becomes impossibly expensive.
Generally, these phenomena are considered separately, or linked only in a broader characterization
of contemporary urban politics (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Ross 2009; Haase et al. 2009). But in
some cities facing the direst extremes of both precarity and gentrification, these processes are not
only linked by public policies, but serve to reproduce each other, creating a “feedback loop” of
displacement and disempowerment.1 By focusing on the policies that bind them, however, social
movements can fight back and break the cycle of perpetual geographic and social marginalization.
Precarity
Precarity can be defined as workers’ position of insecurity in a capitalist labor market (Waite
2009). It is by no means a new phenomenon—there is no such thing as non-precarious capitalism—
but it is generally believed to be on the rise. In many ways, this stands in contrast to our image of
the Fordist period, when job tenure was relatively long and secure, and widespread unionization
provided a layer of protection against arbitrary firing or starvation wages (Freeman 2001). Wage
labor today is hard to come by, turns over frequently, is increasingly atomized, and leaves workers
with less power over the terms and conditions of their labor (Standing 2011).
Career  jobs,  whether  in  factories  or  in  the  professional–managerial  class,  are  virtually  gone.
Today’s economy is driven by extremely high turnover and runs on short-term labor. From multi-
billion-dollar multinationals (Peck and Theodore 1998) to small Chinese restaurants off suburban
highways (Guest 2011), firms are using job placement services to fill their temporary labor needs,
and  sending  their  workers  packing  when  the  task  is  done  or  “new  blood”  is  desired.  In  this
environment, workers across the country and around the world are turning to extreme measures to
survive. With apps like TaskRabbit and Postmates, the technologically facilitated “gig economy”
has stepped in to allow precarious workers to bid against each other for small jobs offered by people
with more money than time (Friedman 2014). Even veterans of a more secure labor market are
suffering from the condition of precarity. Every year, thousands of elderly “workampers” provide
1 Take, for example, a 32-year-old adjunct professor (who happens to be the author of this article). Over the past
11 years living in New York City, I have held approximately 16 jobs and lived in 11 different apartments, nine of
them rent-stabilized. Changing jobs was not the only reason I moved frequently, but often it was an important factor.
Each time my job and housing combination changed, I helped a landlord collect higher profits and I felt a little less
economically secure in my city.
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cheap labor to companies like Amazon in exchange for a place to park their RVs (Bruder 2014). All
of  these factors  add up to an exploitable,  disorganized,  unstable  and—most  importantly to  this
argument—mobile labor force.
Gentrification
As precarity  becomes  the  norm,  so  too  has  gentrification  moved  from being  an  exceptional
phenomenon in disinvested cities (Berry 1985) to a nearly ubiquitous marker of rising urban land
and  real-estate  values  (Wyly  and  Hammel  1999).  Gentrification  can  be  a  “chaotic”  concept
(Beauregard 1986), but it is generally understood as a strategy for extracting profit from the city’s
raw materials (i.e. its land and its buildings), a process of reinvestment in disinvested urban spaces,
and, most fundamentally and materially, the replacement of poorer people with richer inhabitants
(Lees  et al. 2013).  Gentrification  is  principally  an economic  process,  whereby cities  become a
renewed site for speculative investment and a spatial fix for capital (Smith 1979). But in order to
meet  that  economic aim,  gentrification must  also take on a political  dimension,  altering public
policies to facilitate this uneven development (Peck and Tickell 2002).
In many cities with a robust history of housing activism and a relatively responsive government,
this means rolling back longstanding tenant protections and rent regulations. New York, Berkeley
(California),  Cambridge (Massachusetts)  and many other  cities  have seen systematic attacks on
long-standing practices of limiting private rents (Gurian 2003; Barton 2012; David 2012). Though
different in every city, all rent-control schemes aim to keep a lid on the private rental market. In
San Francisco,  rent-controlled  apartment  price  increases  are  strictly  limited  during  a  resident’s
tenure, but can escalate to current market levels upon vacancy and turnover. In New York, where
nearly half of the private rental market is subject to rent stabilization or rent control, the rents in
regulated units rise slowly during a tenant’s lease period, but upon vacancy the landlord’s menu of
rent-gouging mechanisms grows substantially.2 In both cases, landlords are highly incentivized by
the system to harass and evict long-term tenants, and maintain a steady stream of transient residents.
Tenants, then, are not just displaced by gentrification’s outcomes—higher rents, higher property
valuations, higher consumer prices—but by the processes of gentrification itself.
The Feedback Loop: Mobility and Rents
Though usually discussed separately,  these two phenomena are intimately linked by a spatial
process and a political policy: hypermobility and the construction of American rent regulations.
First, the spatial process. As jobs become less stable and the lifelong career fades into memory or
imagination,  people  are  forced  to  shape  and  reshape  their  lives  around  a  constantly  shifting
economic landscape. Fast-changing jobs is not the only reason people move frequently, but census
data suggests that it is certainly one key factor. In 2012, 11.7% of the entire US population shifted
from one home to another. Of those who moved, 22.3% of those with jobs moved because of work-
related changes (Ihrke 2014). The trend is more pronounced in New York City, where 72.3% of
residents  who  moved  in  2010/2011  did  so  for  employment-related  reasons;  82.6% of  recently
moved New Yorkers cited “convenient for job” as one of the main reasons they chose their new
neighborhood (American Housing Survey 2011).
2 Rent control began as a wartime cost-saving measure, but continued in New York as a way to address the city’s
perpetual lack of vacant affordable housing. In the 1970s, rent control gave way to rent stabilization, an alternative
and  comparable  (though  in  many  ways  weaker)  system  of  tenant  protections.  With  a  few  exceptions,  these
regulations generally cover all apartments that have the following characteristics: a monthly rent of under $2,500;
located in a building with more than five housing units; built before 1974. As of 2014, New York City contained
approximately 1,030,000 rent-stabilized units and 27,000 rent-controlled units, comprising 48.2% of the total private
rental housing stock.
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Next, the public policy. Rent regulations frequently allow landlords a great deal of leeway to raise
rents upon an apartment’s vacancy. This is a way to reward landlords without raising the ire of
tenants,  who are  thought  unlikely to  mobilize  around rent  increases  at  the  apartment  they just
vacated.
In the case of New York City, the rent laws give owners of rent-stabilized apartments a 20% rent
increase, known as a “vacancy bonus”, every time an apartment changes hands (New York State
2011). This gives landlords a huge incentive to induce high turnover. Common tactics to ensure
churn  include  physical  and  psychological  harassment,  declining  building  conditions,  frivolous
lawsuits, and the use of “dummy” tenants to constantly take and leave apartments. Landlords can
get even bigger bonuses if the prior leaseholder had an especially long tenure or “low” rent,  a
measure leading to severe harassment of elderly tenants and their familial successors (Wyly and
Newman 2010).
Once an apartment is vacant, a landlord can conduct virtually unlimited “individual apartment
improvements”  (IAIs)  and  drive  up  rents  even  further.  Landlords  are  gifted  a  permanent  rent
increase equivalent to either 1/40 or 1/603 of the amount they spend on renovations (New York State
2014). Though enforcement has improved over the past two years (Stein 2013), it is still fairly easy
for a landlord to perform unnecessary or overpriced renovations in order to receive an IAI rent
increase (La Mort 2015).
The point of all these increases is not just higher rents, but deregulation. Since 1993, New York
State has allowed landlords to take their apartments out of rent regulation if they become vacant and
the rents exceed a certain threshold (New York State 2014).4 Once the apartments are deregulated,
landlords can charge whatever the market will bear and tenants will not benefit from a guaranteed
lease renewal.  This process,  known as vacancy decontrol,  puts a target  on every rent-regulated
tenant, and rewards landlords every time they move. Since 1994, roughly 104,000 apartments have
left rent regulation, largely because of vacancy decontrol (Murphy 2014).
The result of all this is a “feedback loop” of precarity  and gentrification. Feedback loops are
flows of information or energy that reinforce each other, creating an escalating circuit of cause and
effect that amplifies each side of the equation. In this case, labor precarity causes mobility; public
policy translates mobility into rent increases; rent increases and frequent vacancies cause rent law
retrenchment and an elevated cost of living; an elevated cost of living limits the power of workers’
paychecks;  weaker  paychecks lead workers  to  take  on additional  jobs;5 juggling  jobs  increases
precarity; and the cycle continues.
Conclusion
Labor precarity does not cause gentrification, and gentrification does not cause precarity.  But
quirks in the rent laws have cemented the two and help both flourish. Once identified, however, this
crucial link suggests opportunities for organizing and action. In New York, the rent laws expire in
June 2015, and the fight to strengthen and renew them will be a key political battleground. The
mechanisms  that  punish  workers  for  moving  frequently—vacancy  bonuses,  IAIs  and  vacancy
decontrol—can be removed from the law. This will not end gentrification or precarity, but it will
stop the feedback loop that mutually reinforces a system of exploitation and propels both processes
forward.  The  labor  and  tenant  movements  can  seize  this  link  as  a  strategic  opportunity  for
collaboration and fight back against the constant churn of mobile labor and unaffordable housing.
3 The rate depends on the number of units in a given building.
4 The threshold currently stands at $2,500.
5 Instead of—or in addition to—taking on other jobs, workers can also seek cheaper housing farther from the city
center. This serves to increase gentrification’s footprint and add unpaid commuting hours to workers’ everyday life.
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